题目：Antisocial responses to the “coal to gas” regulation: An unintended consequence of a residential energy policy （“煤改气”引发的反社会反应：一项居民能源政策的意外后果）
作者：Jing Cao, Tracy Xiao Liu, Rong Ma, and Ang Sun
摘要：Policies geared toward environmental and economic improvement could unexpectedly lead to negative consequences in other dimensions. Such cases raise a red flag to economists and policymakers who aim to deliver comprehensive and sensible policy evaluations. This article investigates antisocial behaviors in response to the Clean Winter Heating Policy (CWHP), which seeks to improve outdoor air quality. Our results show that participating villagers are more likely to violate laws to burn agricultural waste and exhibit lower prosociality in incentivized dictator games and public goods games. We further explore treatment heterogeneities and find that two channels are likely to play a part. First, the CWHP was perceived as a negative income shock. Therefore, the villagers would want to reduce their expenditure on straw disposal and behave less generously in the incentivized games. Second, the CWHP could trigger discontent and directly affect social preference. Additional evidence suggests that the antisocial (less prosocial) responses could have been avoided by granting larger upfront subsidies.
旨在改善环境与经济状况的政策，可能会在其他维度引发意想不到的负面后果。这类案例为致力于提供全面、审慎政策评估的经济学家和决策者敲响了警钟。本文研究了对旨在改善室外空气质量的“清洁取暖政策”（CWHP）的反社会行为的影响。我们的研究结果显示，参与该政策的村民更可能违法焚烧农业废弃物，并且在激励相容的“独裁者博弈”和“公共物品博弈”中表现出较低的亲社会性。我们进一步探究了处理效应的异质性，发现有两种机制可能发挥了作用。第一，该政策被视为一种负向收入冲击。因此，村民希望减少秸秆处理的开销，并在激励博弈中表现得不够慷慨。第二，该政策可能引发不满情绪，并直接影响其社会偏好。额外的证据表明，通过提供更高额度的前期补贴，这类反社会（较低亲社会性）的回应本可以避免。
原文：Cao, J., Liu, T. X., Ma, R., & Sun, A. (2025). Antisocial responses to the “coal to gas” regulation: an unintended consequence of a residential energy policy. Management Science, 71(10), 8698-8726.
链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01459
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